- Perforce patched two critical Puppet flaws on November 3. SecurityWeek reports attackers are exploiting CVE-2026-115731, and CISA added it to its KEV catalog on November 17.
- The flaw lets a holder of a certificate signed by the Puppet CA run code on Puppet Server. Autosigning can make such certificates easy to obtain.
- Upgrade to a fixed release, check your autosign setting, and review wildcard authorization rules, which become stricter after the upgrade.
The server that decides what every machine runs
Configuration tools like Puppet hold unusual authority. They decide which software and settings reach every machine they manage. A flaw in that server is not one broken system. It is a way into every system that trusts it.
That is the lesson of CVE-2026-115731. SecurityWeek reports that attackers are now exploiting this Puppet flaw. A certificate is the digital badge a machine shows to prove it belongs. Here, the badge can be worth more than the machine it was issued to.
What happened
Perforce, which owns Puppet, published an advisory on two flaws. Puppet Core and both Enterprise editions are exposed. CVE-2026-115731 scores 9.4 on the CVSS severity scale. CVE-2026-115732 scores 9.0.
Perforce shipped patches for both on November 3. SecurityWeek reports that attackers were exploiting CVE-2026-115731 by November 4. On November 17, the US cyber agency CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list.
SecurityWeek adds that the flaw also affects OpenVox, another configuration platform. A proof-of-concept exploit for OpenVox appeared soon after the patch. The sources do not say how many organisations were hit. They do not say who is behind the attacks.
How the attack works
After each run, Puppet agents send a report back to the server. SecurityWeek describes the bug as unsafe handling of untrusted data in that report step. In plain terms, the server rebuilds an object from incoming data. It does not check that data closely enough.
The attacker needs a certificate signed by the organisation's own Puppet certificate authority. With one, they can send a booby-trapped report. SecurityWeek says the code then runs on the server with the rights of the Puppet service account.
The damage depends on what that server holds. Perforce warns that the server's signing key could leak. With that key, an attacker could issue certificates that every machine trusts. They could then change the software and settings sent out at each machine's next Puppet run.
Autosigning is the open door
The attack starts with getting a signed certificate. SecurityWeek says outsiders with no credentials could get one. That happens if the authority signs requests automatically without strong checks.
Perforce's guidance explains the weakness. With basic autosigning, any machine can ask for any name. If the name is on an approved list, it is signed on the spot. Perforce calls this insecure. It says to use it only if you fully trust every machine that can reach the server.
Perforce also says basic autosigning is on by default at install in Puppet Enterprise. The approved list can be empty. If the list is empty or missing, nothing is signed automatically.
The second flaw, CVE-2026-115732, is a related trust failure. Under certain conditions, a name that extends an approved name can pass the authorization rules. Perforce says an attacker could then pose as a managed machine. They could read its configuration and secrets, or send false data.
What to ask your team
First, which Puppet versions do we run? Perforce lists these as affected. For Puppet Core: 8.22.1 and older, and 9.1.2 and older. For the Enterprise editions: 2023.8.12, 2025.12.0 and 2026.0.0, and older.
Patched builds exist for each line. On the Enterprise side, move to 2026.0.1, 2025.12.1 or 2023.8.13. For Core, move to 9.1.3 or 8.22.2.
Second, is autosigning on? Run puppet config print autosign --section server on the CA primary server. The result shows which mode is active. If you cannot upgrade at once, Perforce advises turning autosigning off or adding strict checks. It calls these steps temporary.
Third, who can reach our agent hosts? Perforce advises strong access controls on them. Unauthorised users should not be able to read signed certificates or private keys.
Fourth, will the upgrade break our rules? After upgrading, wildcard matching in Puppet's authorization rules is stricter. A rule for *.example.com still matches web.example.com. It no longer matches example.com itself. Test any custom wildcard rules.
One scope note. The two-week patch deadline SecurityWeek mentions applies to US federal agencies under BOD 26-04. It is not a rule for private companies. It does show how CISA rates the risk.
A configuration server is only as trustworthy as the process that decides who gets a certificate.
Produced by the WebPulse Newsroom with AI assistance from the original reporting credited below, and checked against that source by our editorial review. How we use AI.
Original reporting: Perforce.





