- Cisco Talos describes how some attackers store malware server addresses in public blockchain records that no host, registrar or agency can delete or overwrite.
- In WebPulse's reading, the servers those records point to can still be reported and blocked, but the attacker can change the address stored on the chain.
- WebPulse's reading: leaders can ask which systems call public blockchain interfaces and whether anyone reviews that traffic.
The defence that depends on someone answering the phone
Most malware needs to phone home. It asks a server for instructions. That server is the weak point. Cisco Talos calls the command-and-control channel the backbone of a campaign and also its most fragile part.
Defenders can call a hosting provider, a domain registrar or a court. Talos lists the results: addresses null-routed, domains suspended, servers seized. Blocklists can also go out to many endpoints at once. Each step needs someone on the other end who can say yes.
Talos's new analysis shows attackers moving one piece of that setup to a place where nobody can say yes. That piece is the address book, not the server.
Four tricks, each with a known answer
Talos walks through older techniques and how defenders countered each. Domain generation algorithms make thousands of throwaway domains. Defenders answered by reverse engineering the algorithms and predicting the domains.
Domain fronting disguised traffic as visits to a trusted content network. Talos says major cloud providers have largely closed that route. Peer-to-peer networks have no central server. Defenders can still join them as harmless nodes and map the infected machines.
Dead drop resolvers hide server addresses in public places such as social media bios or code repository commits. Defenders work with the service to suspend accounts and remove content. Talos says each of these methods still depends on some central infrastructure that can be shut down under the right conditions.
How a blockchain becomes a dead drop
A public blockchain is a shared ledger, copied across many computers, that only grows. Talos says that once a transaction is confirmed, no single provider or agency can delete or overwrite it.
Talos calls the technique EtherHiding. It uses a smart contract, a small program stored on the Ethereum-style chain. The attacker places an encoded server address inside it. Malware on a victim's machine asks the contract for that address through a public service. The request is a call named eth_call.
Talos notes that eth_call only reads data. It creates no transaction, so the lookups leave no trace on the ledger. Talos also says such lookups can resemble ordinary blockchain queries.
The key limit is easy to miss. The record that holds the address cannot be removed. In WebPulse's reading, the server it names is still an ordinary machine that can be reported, blocked or seized.
The attacker has an answer to that. A smart contract can be edited later through new transactions, so the stored address can be swapped. Talos says the North Korea-linked cluster UNC5342 changed its stored data more than 20 times in a few months. Defenders may keep blocking servers while the pointer moves to a new one.
Who is using it, according to Talos
Talos traces the idea to Bitcoin experiments between 2016 and 2019. One was a Glupteba botnet variant that Trend Micro found in September 2019. Bitcoin's fees, delays and 80-byte payload limit pushed attackers to other chains.
Researchers documented EtherHiding in October 2023. In October 2025, researchers tied it to UNC5142, a financially motivated group linked to the ClearFake campaign. They also tied it to UNC5342, which targets cryptocurrency developers.
Talos also reports that attackers use the TRON blockchain as a front line. They chain it to contracts on BNB Smart Chain. Talos cites a September 2026 report for this. Defenders then face several separate ecosystems at once.
What this means for an organisation
This section is WebPulse's own analysis, not Talos's advice. The address record is out of reach. The servers it points to are not. Reporting and blocking them still matters, but each block may be short-lived if the attacker repoints the contract.
That leaves the victim's side of the exchange. Talos says defenders contain ordinary dead drops partly by monitoring automated outbound API requests from internal endpoints. Our reading is that the same idea applies here, since a blockchain lookup is also an outbound request. Many office laptops have no obvious business reason to make one.
Leaders can put three questions to their security team. Which of our systems call public blockchain interfaces, and why? Would we notice such a call from a machine that has no reason to make it? If our plan relies on a provider removing something, what is the plan when the next server appears at a new address?
The old question was who could shut the server down. A useful new one is which of our own machines should never be asking.
Produced by the WebPulse Newsroom with AI assistance from the original reporting credited below, and checked against that source by our editorial review. How we use AI.
Original reporting: Cisco Talos.





