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Security & Trust

Rapid7 links a scanner-evading rebuilt VPN tool to Webworm

The group reportedly added no new attack code. It removed the traces that made a free VPN easy to spot.

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WebPulse Newsroom
AI-assisted · 4 min read
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Rapid7 links a scanner-evading rebuilt VPN tool to Webworm
In brief
  • Rapid7 says Webworm, a China-aligned group, rebuilt the open-source SoftEther VPN Bridge to remove the traits that make it easy to detect. It attributes this with moderate confidence.
  • Rapid7 found no new malware functionality. The group appears to be hiding a legitimate tool, and only one antivirus vendor flagged the sample on VirusTotal.
  • Government-sector teams should ask whether they can inspect TLS traffic and whether they know normal SoftEther behavior. Rapid7 supplies indicators and a YARA ruleset.

The cheapest malware is the kind nobody has to write. Rapid7's researchers describe a China-aligned group, Webworm, that has taken this idea one step further. It does not just borrow a legitimate tool. It sands off the marks that let defenders recognise it.

What Rapid7 found

Rapid7 analysed a custom build of SoftEther VPN Bridge, version 4.44, build 9807. SoftEther is an open-source VPN program. Rapid7 says Webworm has previously used it to keep quiet, long-term access inside government networks.

The researchers attribute the new build to Webworm with moderate confidence. It is the only public sample they know of. They add that it has been public since January, yet only one antivirus vendor detected it on VirusTotal at the time of their analysis.

Rapid7 found no backdoor and no extra attack features. The researchers write that the actor "prioritizes stealth above raw capability." The code is not trojanized. It is stock software rebuilt from source.

How the disguise works

Rapid7 describes four changes, each aimed at a way defenders normally find SoftEther.

First, the labels. The file presents itself as "Network Monitor Software" from a company called "Network Systems Solutions Inc." Inside the code, "SoftEther VPN" is replaced with "NtMonitor VPN." The renaming is patchy. The service name still reads SEVPNBRIDGE, and many registry paths still mention the SoftEther Project.

Second, the handshake. A SoftEther client proves it speaks the right protocol by sending a known byte pattern, a watermark. Stock SoftEther uses a GIF pattern that scanners know. This build uses a truncated PNG image of the Windows logo instead. Stock SoftEther clients and servers cannot talk to it, and its own traffic does not carry the familiar pattern. The web addresses the protocol uses were also renamed to sound harmless.

Third, the support file. SoftEther needs a resource archive called hamcore.se2 next to the program, which gives defenders something to look for. Rapid7 says the actor shrank the archive and packed it inside the executable. That added about 1.5 MB to the file.

Fourth, the settings. Stock SoftEther keeps its configuration on disk in readable text. This build renames the file setting.conf and encrypts it with a custom RC4-like cipher. The files start with the letters RCEN. Rapid7 has published a Python script to decrypt them.

The shift behind the technique

Rapid7 notes that ESET reported earlier this year that Webworm was moving away from custom malware toward dual-use tools such as SoftEther. Dual-use means software with a legitimate purpose that an attacker can also use. Rapid7 sees this build as a hybrid of the two approaches.

The lesson here is that defenders who hunt for known tools can be outpaced by an attacker who edits the tool's identity. Rapid7 says the group seems to have studied SoftEther's detection surface and answered the easy checks one by one. The attack code is ordinary; the effort went into making the tool forgettable.

Rapid7 says its attribution rests partly on decrypted configurations it has access to. In the configurations that were not likely deliberate tests, the remote address sat in AS 20473, which belongs to The Constant Company, LLC. Rapid7 says that network has been associated with Webworm on many occasions. The company rates its attribution as moderate confidence.

What to ask your team

Rapid7 says one of the most reliable detections available now needs the ability to inspect TLS traffic. Watch for HTTP POST requests sent to the path /update/picture.cgi that are labelled as JPEG images. Their bodies begin with the opening bytes of the custom PNG watermark, not a real photo. Rapid7 also provides indicators and a YARA ruleset, which is a set of rules for matching file patterns, on its public GitHub.

Rapid7 also warns that the branding, web addresses and watermark are easy for the actor to change again. A rule written for today's build may not match the next one. Its advice to government-sector defenders is to learn how SoftEther normally behaves.

Leaders can turn that into three questions. Can we inspect encrypted traffic at all? Do we know which VPN software is approved on our network, so an unlisted one stands out? Do our detections rely on names and file contents, or on behavior?

A tool that looks like a network monitor and behaves like a VPN bridge is easy to overlook. The defence is knowing what your own network should be doing.

Produced by the WebPulse Newsroom with AI assistance from the original reporting credited below, and checked against that source by our editorial review. How we use AI.
Original reporting: Rapid7.