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An attacker used UPS software's script feature to run code on a domain controller

Symantec says an attacker used a documented script feature in PowerPanel Business to run SYSTEM-level commands

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AI-assisted · 4 min read
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An attacker used UPS software's script feature to run code on a domain controller
In brief
  • Symantec describes an intrusion in which an attacker used a documented script feature in CyberPower PowerPanel Business to run commands as SYSTEM on a domain controller.
  • How the attacker reached the product's console is unknown. Symantec names earlier public weaknesses in the product and stolen administrator logins as possible routes.
  • Symantec advises limiting port 3052 to named admin hosts, auditing the script folders, changing default passwords and treating power-management hosts as high-value.

A documented feature ran the code, but the way in is unknown

A battery backup manager exists mainly to shut servers down cleanly when the power fails. Symantec describes an intrusion in which an attacker used that kind of software to run commands on a Windows domain controller. That is the server that handles logins across a network.

The step that ran the code used a documented feature, not a new exploit. That does not mean no weakness was involved. Symantec does not say how the attacker reached the product's web console.

Symantec lists several possible routes. Earlier public advisories describe weaknesses in the product. These include built-in credentials, a default administrator password and a flaw in file uploads. Stolen administrator logins could also have worked.

The case supports a narrow point, and it is Symantec's own. Software that runs scripts with high privilege and can be reached over the network deserves the same scrutiny as remote-administration tools.

Three properties that make this software useful to an attacker

The product is CyberPower PowerPanel Business, or PPB. Symantec says machines running it typically share three properties.

First, it can run commands on its own. An administrator can tie a power event, such as an outage, to a .cmd script. The service runs that script when the event fires.

Second, it has a console reachable over the network. The console runs on an embedded Tomcat web server on TCP port 3052 and offers a REST API.

Third, it has a trusted service with high privilege. The service, ppbed.exe, runs as SYSTEM, the highest privilege level in Windows. Every command it launches inherits that level.

Symantec sums up the feature as one that "simply accepts a script, stores it, and runs it as SYSTEM". It adds that PPB usually sits on hypervisors, database servers, file servers and domain controllers. Those are the systems an intruder most wants to control.

The lesson is about classification. The risk is not the script feature alone. It is the feature combined with its location. Infrastructure software on your most sensitive servers belongs in the same risk tier as remote-management tools.

How the intrusion unfolded

Symantec describes five stages. In stage one, the attacker sent files to the console's upload endpoint on port 3052. Each script showed up first in a temporary extcmd folder. It then ran from the main extcmd folder.

The scripts had names made of "pp" plus five random letters. That made them look like the product's own files.

In stage two, the service ran the scripts as SYSTEM. In stage three, the attacker used the channel as a remote shell. Certutil, a built-in Windows tool, fetched files. PowerShell loaded a small .NET program into memory.

In stage four, the attacker copied the Active Directory database, ntds.dit. It holds the network's account credentials. The attacker edited the scripts, ran them and checked the logs, several times over. Symantec reads that cycle as a live human at the keyboard.

The attacker also switched from ntdsutil to esentutl. That tool can copy the locked database through the Volume Shadow Copy service.

In stage five, PowerShell started a long-running implant, upnpcont.exe. An implant is a program left behind to keep access. It sat in a SYSTEM profile folder and loaded an atl.dll file of unknown reputation.

Symantec calls that pairing the typical pattern of DLL side-loading. That is an inference from the pattern, not a confirmed method. Symantec saw the database being copied. It saw no data leave the network.

Why defenders may miss it

In process records, the activity looks like a power product starting cmd.exe. Symantec warns that a defender may dismiss this as a routine recovery step.

The attacker also leaned almost entirely on built-in Windows tools. So the useful clue is the parent process. Here, that was ppbed.exe.

Symantec has not tied the activity to a known actor. It saw no final payload such as ransomware, so the motive is unclear. Infosecurity Magazine reports that Symantec did not name the victim. This is one intrusion, not a measured trend.

Questions to put to your team

First, do we know every PowerPanel console we run? Symantec advises limiting port 3052 to named administrator hosts. It should stay off the internet, other servers and user networks.

Second, has anyone changed the default administrator password and applied patches? Third, who has compared the script folders on each host with the product defaults? Symantec says to treat unknown scripts as hostile.

Fourth, would our monitoring flag a power service launching cmd.exe or PowerShell? Fifth, if indicators turn up, is there a plan to reset the krbtgt account and rotate credentials widely? Symantec says to assume Active Directory credentials are exposed in that case.

Symantec's broader advice is to treat power-management hosts as high-value assets. The software that keeps servers running can also hand over control of them.

Produced by the WebPulse Newsroom with AI assistance from the original reporting credited below, and checked against that source by our editorial review. How we use AI.
Original reporting: Symantec.