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One Azure identity attempted 150+ deletion or key operations in 35 minutes

Microsoft details Storm-3168 activity in one Azure tenant: deletions, recovery targeting and storage key requests

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One Azure identity attempted 150+ deletion or key operations in 35 minutes
In brief
  • Microsoft says Storm-3168 used two compromised Azure service principals in one tenant, with the second attempting 150+ deletion or credential-collection operations in 35 minutes, in activity Microsoft describes as scripted.
  • Resource locks and deletion protection saved some storage accounts, but most targeted ones were deleted. Microsoft found no ransom note and could not confirm that data left the environment.
  • Microsoft says an employee posted the identity's secret in a public GitHub issue, and edit history kept it visible. Treat exposed secrets as compromised, rotate them, and lock backup resources.

What Microsoft observed

Microsoft Security Research has published findings about Storm-3168, its tracking name for JADEPUFFER. Sysdig identified the group in July 2026, calling it the first publicly documented case of agentic ransomware. Microsoft's account covers a different layer: the actor's Azure activity inside one compromised tenant.

Two compromised service principals, which are non-human workload identities, split the work between them. One handled reconnaissance. Over roughly 15.5 hours in early June 2026, it ran more than 300 successful read requests, cataloging virtual machines, subscriptions, resource groups and other resources across the tenant. The second identity handled further discovery, resource deletion and credential collection.

Both identities connected from the same network fingerprint and used the identical user agent string python-requests/2.34.2 — a pattern Microsoft points to as evidence that the timing and division of labor between the two accounts reflects scripted execution rather than a person working manually.

Where safeguards held, and where they did not

The deletion sequence lasted about seven minutes. Most of the targeted Azure Storage accounts were deleted. A Key Vault, a Function App and an App Service plan were also removed. The actor also made unsuccessful attempts to remove Azure Site Recovery and Azure Backup protection locks, and it targeted storage accounts with terraform- and backup-themed names. Microsoft says this was potentially aimed at impairing recovery.

Some attempts failed. A handful of the targeted storage accounts survived because they carried resource locks or account-level deletion protection. Microsoft points to those survivals as an argument for controls that hold independently even after an identity has already gained broad administrative reach. Every attempt to delete an Azure SQL database failed for a different reason: the actor used an API version the resource type no longer supports.

The actor did not exceed the identity's permissions. Microsoft reports that the operations followed existing role assignments. The storage deletions were authorized by a Storage Account Contributor role the identity held through group membership, while a separate, directly assigned Contributor role covered the Key Vault, Function App and App Service plan deletions. About 30 minutes after the last deletion, the same identity issued more than 30 successful ListKeys requests, pulling access keys for storage accounts.

The credential question

Microsoft says an employee at the affected organization had, at some point, posted the service principal's client ID, client secret and tenant ID in plain text inside a public GitHub issue. Someone later edited the post to strip the secret out — but GitHub's edit history preserved the original text, leaving the credential visible to anyone who checked it. Microsoft states it could not confirm whether this specific secret was used in the activity it describes, and that how the identity was first compromised remains unclear.

Microsoft's guidance on the exposure is direct: removing or redacting a secret does not invalidate it. Credentials exposed in any public location should be treated as compromised and revoked or rotated.

What is not established

Microsoft says it did not find a ransom note and could not confirm that data left the environment. What it did document — resource deletion, interference with recovery locks, and collection of storage keys — resembles the tactics that typically precede ransomware or extortion demands, in the company's assessment. Microsoft also frames the activity as part of a broader shift toward AI-orchestrated attacks. Its own findings establish automated or scripted execution inside Azure; the agentic-ransomware label originates from Sysdig's separate reporting on JADEPUFFER.

What to ask your team

1. Which service principals in our tenants hold Contributor or Storage Account Contributor roles, including roles granted through groups? What is the minimum each application needs?

2. Do backup and recovery resources carry resource locks and deletion protection that a broadly permissioned identity cannot remove? In this incident, those controls blocked some deletions.

3. Have we searched public repositories, issues and their edit histories for client secrets, storage keys and connection strings? If we find one, is it rotated rather than only redacted?

4. If one identity issued 100+ deletion attempts in seven minutes in our environment, which alert would fire, who would receive it, and how quickly could that identity be disabled?

Produced by the WebPulse Newsroom with AI assistance from the original reporting credited below, and checked against that source by our editorial review. How we use AI.
Original reporting: Microsoft Security.